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Feminist Court Watch
Chronology: US Supreme Court Reproductive Rights Cases
1965
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut statute
that prohibited the use of contraceptives, holding that the statute
violated the constitutional right to marital privacy. (NARAL)
1972
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438
By a vote of 6-1, the Court invalidated a law prohibiting the distribution
of contraceptives to unmarried people, holding that the constitutional
right to privacy extends to the reproductive decisions of both married
and unmarried people. (NARAL)
1973
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113
On January 22, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the restrictive
Texas and Georgia abortion statutes unconstitutional. In the 7 to
2 decision, the Court overruled all state laws that prohibit or
restrict a woman's right to obtain an abortion during the first
three months of pregnancy. The Court held that "the right of
privacy . . . is broad enough to compass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy." After discussing some of
the reasons why a woman might decide to have an abortion, the Court
said, "All these factors the woman and her responsible physician
necessarily will consider in consultation." The Court held
that after the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, the state
may have a compelling interest in the health of the mother, because
abortion becomes more dangerous at that point. Justice Harry Blackmun,
speaking for the Court, declared that "from and after this
point, the State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent
that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection
of maternal health." Reasonable regulation, according to the
Court, may be concerned with such things as the qualifications of
the person who performs abortions and the facility where the abortions
are performed. In dismissing the contention that the State has a
compelling interest in protecting the embryo from conception on,
the Court concluded: "In short, the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense." The State's
interest in potential life arises only at viability-which the Court
defined as starting from 24 to 28 weeks of gestation. During this
final period, the court held: "If the State is interested in
protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period except when it is necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother." (Ms.) more
details>>
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S 52
By a vote of 6-3, the Court invalidated provisions of a Missouri
statute that (1) required a married woman to obtain the consent
of her husband prior to obtaining an abortion; (2) required a physician
to preserve the life and health of the fetus at every stage of pregnancy;
(3) prohibited the use of saline amniocentesis as a method of abortion.
By a vote of 5-4, the Court stuck down a requirement that an unmarried
minor woman obtain the written consent of one parent before obtaining
an abortion because the statute provided no alternative to parental
consent such as judicial waiver of the consent requirement. The
Court upheld provisions that (1) required facilities to keep confidential
records, available only for statistical purposes to public health
officials, intended to preserve maternal health and life by increasing
medical knowledge and to monitor whether abortions are performed
in accordance with the law; (2) required that a woman sign a consent
from prior to an abortion; and (3) defined “viability”
as “that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn
child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural
or artificial life supportive systems.” (NARAL)
Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S 678
By a vote of 7-2, the Court invalidated a New York law prohibiting
the sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors. (NARAL)
1976
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S 132
The Court unanimously ruled that the district court should have
abstained from deciding the constitutionality of a Massachusetts
statute requiring parental consent until the state court had interpreted
the statute. The Court noted, however that a state may, in some
circumstances, require a minor woman to obtain parental consent
before obtaining an abortion. (NARAL)
1979
Bellotti v. Baird (II) 443 U.S 622
By a vote of 8-1, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law that
required a minor to obtain the consent of both parents before obtaining
an abortion. Four Justices reasoned that the procedure for judicial
waiver was unconstitutional because it required parental consultation
in every case before the minor woman was permitted to go to court
to demonstrate that she was mature enough to make her own decision
or that an abortion was in her best interests. Four other Justices
considered the statue unconstitutional because it provided an absolute
veto over a minor woman’s abortion decision to a third-party,
whether a parent or a judge. (NARAL)
1980
Harris v. McRae 448 U.S 297
By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld the Hyde amendment, which prohibits
the use of federal funds for abortions not necessary to preserve
the woman’s life. The Court also held that states that participate
in the Medical program are not required by Title XIX of the Social
Security Act to fund medically necessary abortions for which federal
funds are unavailable under the Hyde amendment. (NARAL)
Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S 358
Decided with Harris v. McRae. By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld
an Illinois statute prohibiting the use of state funds for abortions
not necessary to save the woman’s life. (NARAL)
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S 747
By a vote of 5-4, the Court invalidated provisions of Pennsylvania
statute that require: (1) physicians to secure “informed consent”
by providing anti-abortion information, including the availability
of State-supplied printed materials describing the characteristics
of the fetus and listing alternatives to abortion; (2) the reporting
of detailed information available to the public for copying, including
identification of the performing and referring physicians and personal
information about the woman obtaining an abortion: (3) a physician
performing a post-viability abortion to use that “degree of
care” required to preserve the life and health of any unborn
child intended to be born and to use the method of abortion most
likely to preserve the life of the fetus, unless it would present
a significantly greater medical risk to the woman’s life or
health; and (4) the presence of a second physician at abortions
when viability is possible without providing an exception for a
medical emergency. (NARAL)
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S 173
By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld federal regulations prohibiting
health care professionals at family planning clinics that receive
Title X funds from counseling or referring women regarding abortion,
or even informing a pregnant patient that abortion is a legal option.
(NARAL)
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S 833
By a vote of 7-2, the Court upheld provisions of a Pennsylvania
statute that required (1) physicians to provide patients with anti-abortion
information, including pictures of fetuses at various stages of
development, to discourage women from obtaining abortions; (2) a
mandatory 24-hour delay following these lectures; (3) the filing
of reports, available for public inspection and copying, including
the name and location of any facility performing abortions that
receives any state funds; and (4) a one-parent consent requirement
for minors with a judicial bypass. The Court explicitly overruled
parts of Akron and Thornburgh. The plurality opinion of three Justices
abandoned the strict scrutiny standard of review applied to fundamental
rights for a less protective “undue burden” standard
of review, which these restrictions passed. Two Justices voted to
continue to protect the right to choose as a fundamental right under
Roe by subjecting state restrictions to strict scrutiny. These five
Justices voted to strike down a provision that barred a married
woman from obtaining an abortion unless she notified her husband.
Four Justices voted to uphold all challenged provisions and overturn
Roe completely, stating that it was wrongly decided and the Constitution
does not protect the right to choose. (NARAL)
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S 263
By a vote of 5-4, the Court held that a federal civil rights law,
known as the “Ku Klux Klan” Act, 42 U.S.C 1985, does
not protect women from anti-choice blockaders obstructing access
to reproductive health clinics. The Court held that anti-choice
blockades do not constitute sex-based discrimination for the purpose
of the statue. (NARAL)
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S 753
By a vote of 9-0, the Court held that claims under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) act do not require proof
of an economic motive, and that NOW and a group of women’s
health centers could pursue their civil suit against Joseph Scheidler,
the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) and others anti-choice clinic
blockaders. (NARAL)
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S 753
By a vote of 5-4 the Court upheld provisions of a Florida injunction
that (1) created a 36-foot buffer zone outside the entrance to a
reproductive health clinic; and (2) prohibited anti-choice protesters
from making noise that could be heard by patients inside the clinic
during the hours in which surgical procedures were performed. The
Court noted that such injunctions burden no more speech
than necessary to serve a significant government interest.
The court invalidated provisions creating a 300-foot no
approach zone around the clinic, a ban on signs and images
visible to people inside the clinic, and a 300-foot ban on picketing
outside the residences of clinic employees. (NARAL)
1997
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S 357
By a vote of 8-1, the Court invalidated the provision in a New
York injunction that created a 15-foot floating
buffer zone around any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving
a clinic. The Court held that the floating buffer
zones burden more speech than necessary to serve the relevant
government interests. The Court limited this holding to
the facts of this case and noted that it did not address whether
the governmental interests involved would ever justify some sort
of zone of separation between individuals entering the clinics and
protestors, as measured by the distance between the two. By a vote
of 6-3, the Court upheld a provision creating a 15-foot fixed
buffer zone outside of clinic doorways, driveways, and parking lot
entrances. The Court also upheld a cease and desist
provision that permits two sidewalk counselors to
approach a person inside the fixed buffer zones
unless and until the person indicates a desire for the counselor
to withdraw; the sidewalk counselor must then retreat
15 feet from the person he/she had been counseling and remain outside
of the buffer zone. (NARAL)
2000
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S 914
By a vote of 5-4, the Court invalidated a Nebraska law that prohibited
so-called “partial birth” abortion unless the procedure
is necessary to save the life of the woman. First, the Court held
that the Nebraska law is unconstitutional because it lacks any exception
to protect woman’s health, noting that “since the law
requires a health exception in order to validate even a postviability
abortion regulation, it at a minimum requires the same in respect
to a previability regulation.” The Court also clarified that
the health exception must protect women against health risks caused
by the pregnancy as well as health risks caused by a regulation
that forces women to choose a less medically appropriate procedure.
Second, the Court found that the Nebraska law imposed an undue burden
on women because it was written so broadly that it would affect
not only dilation and extraction (D&X) procedures, but also
dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedures, the most common form
of previability second trimester abortions. The Court reasoned that
physicians who used the D&E procedure would fear prosecution,
conviction, and imprisonment, resulting in an undue burden upon
a woman’s right to choose. (Ms.)
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S 703
By a vote of 6-3, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
zone of separation provision in Colorado’s clinic protection
statute. The provision prohibits a person from knowingly approaching
within eight feet of another person without consent, for the purpose
of passing a leaflet or handbill, displaying a sign, or engaging
in oral protest, education, or counseling. This restriction applies
within a 100-foot radius from clinic entrances. The Court reasoned
that states have a legitimate interest in protecting the health
and safety of their citizens, and that this interest “may
justify a special focus on unimpeded access to health care facilities
and the avoidance of potential trauma to patients associated with
confrontational protests.” The Court held that the Colorado
statute is content neutral because it only regulates where the speech
can occur. In addition, the statute was not adopted because of any
disagreement with the message or viewpoint of any speech. Further,
Colorado’s interests in protecting clinic access and privacy,
and providing clear guidelines for law enforcement officers, are
not related to the content of the demonstrator’s speech. The
Court also held that the zone of separation provision is a valid
time, place, and manner regulation because it is narrowly tailored
to serve the State’s significant and legitimate governmental
interests and leaves open ample alternative channels for communication.
Such channels include communicating at normal conversational distance,
displaying signs, and distributing leaflets near the path of oncoming
pedestrians. (NARAL)
2001
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S 67
By a vote of 6-3, the Court held that the Medical University of
South Carolina’s policy of testing pregnant women for cocaine
is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of
consent. The Court recognized that the purpose of the policy was
to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution, not to help pregnant
women or their fetuses. The Court also noted that punitive programs
that punish pregnant women for drug use during pregnancy can actually
harm the women and children they purport to protect. (NARAL)
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